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This essay critically assesses Roman Ingarden’s 1915 review of the second edition of Edmund Hus-
serl’s Logical Investigations. I elucidate and critique Ingarden’s analysis of the differences between the 
1901 first edition and the 1913 second edition. I specifically examine three tenets of Ingarden’s inter-
pretation. First, I demonstrate that Ingarden correctly denounces Husserl’s claim that he only engages 
in an eidetic study of consciousness in 1913, as Husserl was already performing eidetic analyses in 
1901. Second, I show that Ingarden is misguided, when he asserts that Husserl had fully transformed 
his philosophy into a transcendental idealism in the second edition. While Husserl does appear to 
adopt a transcendental phenomenology by asserting–in his programmatic claims–that the intentional 
content and object are now included in his domain of research, he does not alter his actual descrip-
tions of the intentional relationship in any pertinent manner. Third, I show Ingarden correctly predicts 
many of the insights Husserl would arrive at about logic in his late philosophy. This analysis augments 
current readings of the evolution of Ingarden’s philosophy, by more closely examining the development 
of his largely neglected early thought. I execute this critical assessment by drawing both from Hus-
serl’s later writings and from recent literature on the Investigations. By doing so, I hope to additionally 
demonstrate how research on the Investigations has matured in the one hundred years since the release 
of that text, while also presenting my own views concerning these difficult interpretative issues. 
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В статье дается критическая оценка написанной в  1915  году рецензии Романа Ингардена на 
второе издание «Логических исследований» Эдмунда Гуссерля. Я проясняю и критикую про-
ведённый Ингарденом анализ различий между первым изданием 1901 года и вторым издани-
ем 1913  года. Я отдельно останавливаюсь на трёх положениях его интерпретации. В первую 
очередь, я показываю, что Ингарден справедливо отвергает утверждение Гуссерля о том, что 
он начинает практиковать эйдетический подход к исследованию сознания только в 1913 году, 
поскольку Гуссерль уже проводил эйдетический анализ в 1901 году. Во-вторых, я показываю, 
что Ингарден заблуждается, полагая, что во втором издании Гуссерль полностью преобразовал 
собственную философию в трансцендентальный идеализм. В то время как Гуссерль, судя по 
всему, принимая трансцендентальную феноменологию и утверждая в своих программных за-
явлениях, что интенциональное содержание и объект отныне включены в область его исследо-
вания, фактически не изменяет описания интенциональных отношений соответствующим об-
разом. В-третьих, я показываю, что Ингарден верно предсказывает ряд логических идей Гуссер-
ля, свойственных его поздней философии. Этот анализ дополняет современные представления 
об эволюции философии Ингардена, более пристально акцентируя развитие его практически 
забытой ранней мысли. Моя критическая оценка опирается как на позднейшие труды Гуссер-
ля, так и на новейшую литературу, посвященную «Исследованиям». Действуя таким образом, 
я надеюсь продемонстрировать то, как развивалось восприятие «Исследований» в течение ста 
лет после выхода этого текста, а также изложить свои собственные взгляды на эти затрудни-
тельные вопросы.
Ключевые слова: Ингарден, Гуссерль, феноменология, Логические исследования, трансценден-
тальная редукция, логическая грамматика, сущность, дескриптивная психология.
1. INTRODUCTION
During his studies in Göttingen, Roman Ingarden came to interpret Edmund 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations (Husserl, 1984; Hereafter, Investigations)1 as endors-
ing metaphysical realism, a view which Ingarden looked favorably upon. Ingarden 
took Husserl as claiming that there existed an objective reality behind the presented 
phenomena. Certainly, Ingarden was not alone in this reading of Husserl, as both his 
1 I provide references to the corresponding English translation where available, following a slash after 
the page number of the text, in its original language.
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contemporaries from the Göttingen school and many later phenomenologists have 
understood the early Husserl in this manner2. Moreover, Husserl’s courses, which 
Ingarden attended, also seem to suggest that this interpretation was correct. In the 
1912/13 “Metaphysical and Scientific Exercises concerning Nature and Spiritб” Hus-
serl certainly does follow his more realist tendencies3. 
For these reasons, Ingarden was most surprised with the contents of Ideas I 
(Husserl, 1977), which was published in 1913 and discussed in the 1913/14 Winter 
Course, “Phenomenological Exercises for the Advanced Student.” Reasonably, but 
incorrectly, Ingarden perceived Husserl as abandoning his realist project, instead 
adopting the opposite position of metaphysical idealism4. Ingarden, as is well known, 
largely considered this to be a mistake on Husserl’s part and was rather disturbed by 
2 For example, Emmanuel Levinas, in his study of Husserl’s theory of intuition, interpreted Husserl as 
if his early descriptions of intentionality endorsed a metaphysically realist position (Levinas, 1978). 
For another case, Theodore De Boer unabashedly asserts that the Husserl of 1901 concluded that 
there is a world that exists behind the appearances of the phenomena (De Boer, 1978, 195–197). 
Finally, even J. N. Findlay, the English translator of the Investigations, argues that Husserl adopted a 
metaphysically realist position in his “breakthrough work” and that he had become a metaphysical 
idealist after the transcendental turn of 1907 (Findlay, 1972, 235–243).
3 It is surprising that this view has been so historically popular, because it is relatively clear, from 
many of Husserl’s statements throughout the Investigations, that his 1901 philosophy took a meta-
physically neutral stance towards the question of reality. In the Second Investigation, Husserl not 
only explicitly rejects metaphysical realism by denying that there is something that is independent 
of consciousness, but also affirms that all metaphysical definitions of reality need to be set aside 
during his analysis (Husserl, 1984, 129). Moreover, in the Fifth Investigation, he emphasizes that 
there is a fundamental distinction between metaphysical and phenomenological projects (Husserl, 
1984, 401). Finally, in the Sixth Investigation, Husserl rebukes Kant for falling into a metaphysically 
polluted philosophy (Husserl, 1984, 729–732). At the same time, I also do not fully understand how 
Ingarden, prior to 1913, did not realize that Husserl had begun to formulate and adopt transcen-
dental idealism. This seems curious to me, because Husserl, in his 1906–1907 lecture course—“In-
troduction to Logic and the Theory of Knowledge” (Husserl, 1985)—lays out his discovery of the 
three “paths” to the epoché and the transcendental reduction. Dan Zahavi explains that in those 
lectures, “Husserl argues that it is necessary to leave the project of a descriptive phenomenology be-
hind in favor of a transcendental phenomenology if one wishes to truly clarify the relation between 
the act, the meaning, and the intended transcendent object” (Zahavi, 2002, 102). Even though In-
garden did not attend these lectures, it seems that he naturally would have at least been informed 
about their contents. Cf. (Płotka, 2017, 84).
4 Mitscherling elucidates Ingarden’s views on the Husserl of 1901 and 1913, writing, “Ingarden main-
tains that Husserl clearly occupied a realist position at the time of the Logical Investigations but 
that from the time of the Ideas he headed in the direction of transcendental idealism. He further 
maintains that the arguments in support of Husserl’s idealist position are either unsatisfactory or 
even quite wrong” (1997, 49). To be noted is that Ingarden did not only initially oppose this osten-
sible turn in Husserl’s thought, but sought throughout his career to demonstrate why it was mis-
guided. This tendency of Ingarden’s philosophy culminated in his Controversy over the Existence of 
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this development5. It is just at this turning point in Ingarden’s philosophical career, in 
1915, that he wrote his first ever publication, which is a review of the second edition of 
the Investigations (Ingarden, 1915/1993; Hereafter, Review), which Husserl published 
in 1913.
Ingarden must have found himself in a difficult position when trying to review 
the new edition of Investigations. This is, in part, because Husserl sought, with his 
alterations, “to raise the old work entirely and truly to the level of the Ideas” (Husserl, 
1975, 10). At the same time, Husserl believed that this process of modification and 
raising had to be gradual6, where the Investigations could only conform to the insights 
of Ideas at the end of the text, that is, once the new draft of the Sixth Investigation 
was composed and released7. However, Husserl never completed this task, as he cut 
off his modifications of the Sixth Investigation after attempting to rewrite the entire 
text from scratch8. Accordingly, when reading the second edition of the Investigations, 
while one can see that Husserl is striving to achieve a unity with Ideas, it becomes 
clear that the Investigations never actually reach that point. Furthermore, because the 
revisions were only partially finished, further complications arise, where the insights 
of the First through Fifth Investigations seem to be not wholly consistent with those 
from the Sixth. As Ingarden had largely accepted Husserl’s descriptive psychology 
the World (Ingarden, 1947), wherein Ingarden advocates, in contrast to Husserl, for an ontological 
methodological approach. Cf. (Gierulanka, 1989, 8).
5 At that time, it was not only Ingarden who saw Husserl’s shift in perspective problematic. Rather, 
many of Husserl’s other students — especially his older pupils from the Göttingen circle — found 
Husserl’s new position upsetting. Ingarden recalls that in the seminars that followed the publication 
of the Ideas, “Quickly, there developed a very lively discussion, as many of Husserl’s older students 
raised objections against the idealistic tendency with regards to the sense and operation of the tran-
scendental reduction from Ideas I […]. A series of claims from Ideas I created a certain confusion 
among the circle of Husserl’s students from Göttingen, and thus there were many active confron-
tations between individual participants of the seminar and Husserl, who strived, above all else, to 
clarify the correct sense of his expositions in the Ideas and also to defend his standpoint from a se-
ries of questions […]. During the course of the discussion of Husserl’s seminar from 1913/15, there 
began to arise continually more sharp differences between Husserl’s standpoint and the standpoint 
of his students from the Göttingen school” (Ingarden, 1968, 113). For further discussion of this 
controversy, cf. (Plotka, 2020a, 2020b). 
6 Husserl writes that he wished, “To lift the reader gradually, in the course of discussion, to a relative-
ly raised total level of insight” (1975, 11/1970, 5). 
7 Husserl writes that the reader should, “in a conscious way be raised, and truly so, such that, in the 
final Investigation, in essence, the level of the Ideas is reached” (1975, 11/1970, 5).
8 For more information on Husserl’s incomplete revisions to the Sixth Investigation, now published 
as Husserliana XX-1/2 (2005, 2005), see (Bernet, 1988; Byrne, 2020a, 2020b; Melle, 1998, 2002).
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from 1901 and rejected his transcendental idealism from the 1913 Ideas, he must have 
been split about how to review the second edition, which is a strange mixture of both9.
Despite the fact that Ingarden’s Review was composed at this unmooring point 
in his career, where he was beginning to formulate his opposition to Husserl’s new 
theory, and even though it was published at this turning point in phenomenology as a 
whole, little attention has been paid to it. Scholars have instead chosen to focus more 
on Ingarden’s later work, where he presents his mature theory and his robust critique 
of Husserl in more detail10. This essay seeks to remedy this gap in the literature: The 
paper critically engages with Ingarden’s Review of the second edition of the Investigations. 
This analysis augments current readings of the evolution of Ingarden’s philosophy, 
by more closely examining the development of his largely neglected early thought. 
I execute this critical assessment by drawing both from Husserl’s later writings and 
from recent literature on Husserl’s Investigations. In doing so, I hope to additionally 
demonstrate how continental research on the Investigations has evolved and matured 
in the over one hundred years since the publication of that text, while also taking my 
own stance on these controversial interpretative issues11.
Throughout my critical engagement with Ingarden’s Review, I not only seek to 
point out the elements of his discussion of Husserl that are not fully justified, but also 
the fragments that seem to be adequate12. Concerning the former, with the hindsight 
of over a century of secondary literature behind us and with the continued publication 
of the Husserliana Editions, it is naturally possible to recognize where Ingarden did 
not interpret Husserl entirely correctly. More interesting; however, is that Ingarden’s 
Review is much more accurate than one would expect. Husserl’s designation of Ing-
arden as his “most serious and gifted” student (Schuhmann, 1977, 178), was certainly 
right, as his Review demonstrates that he had a better understanding of Husserl’s phi-
losophy than even many scholars today. The precision of Ingarden’s Review is, in large 
part, due to his methodological approach. Perhaps because Ingarden was torn about 
how to interpret the second edition—as it mixes transcendental phenomenology with 
9 Indeed, as Husserl says, in the new edition, he was struggling “to work the old and the new into 
one.” For more information on Husserl’s process of synthesis, see (Panzer, 1984, XVI–XVII).
10 Cf. (Bielawka, 2011; Bostar, 1994; Galarowicz, 1982; Kroński, 1933; Tischner, 1972; Wallner, 1987).
11 Zahavi writes, “I think it is virtually impossible to appraise the phenomenological project in Logical 
Investigations without taking a stand on its relation to Husserl’s later works” (Zahavi, 2002, 102).
12 In this sense, the goals of the current work stand in contrast to much of the contemporary litera-
ture. As Mitscherling writes, “Much of the most recent scholarship has attempted both to discred-
it Ingarden’s criticisms of Husserl and to establish that Husserl was not in fact an idealist at all” 
(Mitscherling, 1997, 44).
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descriptive psychology—there is, strictly speaking, not a single direct critical remark 
about Husserl’s changes. While Ingarden’s Review is certainly not neutral, he still states 
and explores some of the alterations Husserl made in a matter of fact way13. Because of 
Ingarden’s straightforward examination of the second edition, his Review is not tinged 
with the bias one would expect. Instead, Ingarden’s Review is rigorous and fair.
While Ingarden claims that his text addresses four tenets of Husserl’s theory14, I 
find it more appropriate to execute the critical assessment of his Review by examining 
three of Ingarden’s insights15. In section two, I look at Ingarden’s discussion of Hus-
serl’s views on eidetics in the first and second edition. In section three, I examine Ing-
arden’s conclusions about the importance of Husserl’s “discovery” of the transcenden-
tal reduction for the second edition. In section four, I explore Ingarden’s assessment 
of Husserl’s changes to his pure logical grammar16. Finally, in section five, I briefly 
mention how further study of Review could augment contemporary scholarship on 
the evolution of Ingarden’s thought. Concerning methodology, in each section of the 
body of the text, I first discuss Ingarden’s straightforward elucidation of Husserl’s the-
ory in 1901 and 1913. I then lay out Ingarden’s assessment or critique of Husserl’s 
understanding of the changes from the first to the second edition. Finally, I examine 
whether Ingarden is correct in his appraisal of Husserl. 
13 I would contend, in contrast to Szylewicz, that Ingarden did not publish his Review in Polish so as 
to be “non-confrontational” (Ingarden, 1993, 2–3) with Husserl, as there simply is no confrontation 
to speak of in the essay at all. Rather Ingarden likely released his Review in Polish to evangelize on 
behalf of phenomenology, as that school of thought was not well known by the Polish philosophical 
community at the time. This attempt was; however, ultimately less than successful. As Mitscherling 
writes, “It should be mentioned here that Ingarden remained in a sense ‘philosophically isolated’ 
for the better part of his career, for phenomenology never came to be widely accepted as legitimate 
philosophy in Poland” (Mitscherling, 1997, 17).
14 Ingarden asserts that, in his Review, he will address (1) the kinds of objects Husserl’s philosophy 
investigates, (2) the scope of Husserl’s analysis, (3) Husserl’s methods, and (4) the epistemic value of 
Husserl’s philosophy (Ingarden, 1915, 306/1993, 4).
15 For those further interested in historical details, Ingarden discusses some of the events that led up 
to his composition of the review of the second edition in his “My Memories of Edmund Husserl” 
(Ingarden, 1968), as can be found on pages, 57–58. 
16 To be clear, in this essay I only discuss that which Ingarden says about the Investigations and do not 
criticize him for not addressing other transformations Husserl made to his philosophy in 1913. To 
rebuke Ingarden, because he did not explore each and every one of Husserl’s changes would cer-
tainly be unfair to Ingarden, especially because he asserts–at the start of his text–that he will only 
examine “substantive changes in the solutions of problems” and “amplifications supported by new 
analyses” in his very short Review (Ingarden, 1915, 305/1993, 4).
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2. EIDETIC REDUCTION
Ingarden begins his Review by analyzing Husserl’s dubious claim, found both 
in the foreword to and in the body of the second edition, that a primary difference 
between the first and second editions is that, in the latter, but not in the former, he 
executes the eidetic reduction. According to Husserl, this results in a situation where 
the objects studied, the methods of investigation, and the nature of the discoveries of 
the two editions are fundamentally different.
In the first edition, because—as Husserl claims—he had not performed the 
eidetic reduction, he believes that he was only looking to describe real experienc-
es and was—ostensibly—not seeking to uncover the essences of those experiences. 
His descriptive psychology supposedly was studying the real events of the existing 
psycho-physical subject in the world. Summarizing Husserl’s view, Ingarden writes, 
“the objects of [the 1901] descriptive psychology are the real experiences of mind 
endowed individuals–hence, facts belonging to the real” (Ingarden, 1915, 306/1993, 
4)17. Methodologically, to study these real experiences of the subject, the descriptive 
psychologist simply executes an inner perception to examine their ongoing mental 
processes18. To further explain this point, Husserl writes in the foreword to the second 
edition that in the first edition, “the psychological description performed in inner ex-
perience are put on a level with description of the external events in nature performed 
in external description” (Husserl, 1975, 13). Finally, Husserl asserts that, because of 
its objects and method, the results of (descriptive) psychology are relative. As they are 
discovered via induction, they are “merely probable,” and contingent upon the factical 
nature of consciousness (Ingarden, 1915, 306/1993, 5)19.
In the second edition; however, Ingarden writes that, “Husserl adds extensive 
remarks concerning the phenomenological method, placing particular emphasis on 
reductions, which […] make it possible to adopt a stance oriented toward the pure 
essences of the items under investigation” (Ingarden, 1915, 305/1993, 5). By taking 
into account the eidetic goal of his philosophy in the second edition, Husserl can fo-
cus on the essence of different experiences, rather than on merely describing the real 
17 In his recent article, Płotka expertly discusses Ingarden’s conception of psychology. Cf. (Płotka, 
2020b, 154–157).
18 Ingarden explains Husserl’s point by asserting, “The objects of descriptive psychology, on the other 
hand, are accessible to knowledge in an act of inner experience, an experience that serves as the sole 
possible means for establishing their real existence” (Ingarden, 1915, 305/1993, 4).
19 Husserl makes one exception to this conclusion. As Ingarden states, “this does not, of course, apply 
to rational psychology, i.e., the pure ontology of mental states” (Ingarden, 1915, 305/1993, 5). 
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experiences of real persons. Husserl writes, in 1913, that, “The descriptions of phe-
nomenology are said to deal neither with lived experiences of empirical persons. […] 
Phenomenology knows nothing of persons: it raises no questions in regard to such 
matters” (Husserl, 1975, 13). Ingarden interprets this claim to mean that, for Husserl, 
the objects studied in the new edition are, “the essences of Experiences and the inter-
connections between them.” As a result of the eidetic reduction, the laws revealed by 
phenomenology are thus laws that “are valid irrespective of whether or not individual 
objects falling under a given ‘Species’ do exist in the mode of reality” (Ingarden, 1915, 
305/1993, 5). Accordingly, Husserl also can claim that the discoveries of phenome-
nology obtain a priori and are not relative in the way that the results of descriptive 
psychology are.
After outlining Husserl’s conclusions about his own work, we find several state-
ments by Ingarden, which, while not straightforwardly critical, do indicate Ingarden’s 
recognition of the fact that Husserl is not entirely accurate in his later assessment of 
the first edition. As Heidegger would later note in 1919, Husserl’s understanding of 
his project in the Investigations was deficient and that it is necessary to differentiate 
between and separately analyze Husserl’s meta-reflections about his own works and 
the actual analyses found in Husserl’s texts (Cf. Heidegger, 2010, 120). For Ingarden’s 
part, he claims that Husserl was incorrect in his 1913 interpretation that his 1901 text 
was—because of its methodology—unconcerned with essences. Instead, Ingarden as-
serts that Husserl was already studying essences in the 1901 work. Speaking of the 
first edition, Ingarden writes that, “as a matter of fact, already at that time the bulk 
of the analyses had the form of an a priori cognition of the essence of consciousness” 
(Ingarden, 1915, 306, n. 1/1993, 11, n. 26). At another point, Ingarden claims that, 
even though Husserl wants to say that there are these important differences between 
the first and second edition, “for the most part, it is in this spirit,” that is, in the spirit 
of the eidetic reduction, “that the logical investigations were carried out” in the first 
edition (Ingarden, 1915, 307/1993, 5). 
The important questions for current purposes are: Are these interpretative 
claims made by Ingarden correct? Is Ingarden right in his indirect criticism of Hus-
serl’s own reading of his 1901 and 1913 views on eidetics? While the answer is messy 
(as almost any conclusion about the relationship between the first and second edition 
is), one can say that Ingarden is mostly right in his assessment20.
20 Ingarden’s conclusions are not only correct in themselves, but they also correspond with his later 
findings. In both his essay On the Aims of Phenomenologists (Ingarden, 1919) and in his „Über die 
Gefahr einer Petitio Principii in der Erkenntnistheorie“ (Ingarden, 1921), Ingarden holds that the 
eidetic approach is fundamental for phenomenology, even if one does not call this level of analysis 
HORIZON 9 (2) 2020 521
On the one hand, Husserl himself admits, in his “Draft of a Preface to the Logi-
cal Investigations” (Husserl, 2002)21, that he had already, albeit inchoately, developed 
his philosophy as an eidetics in the first edition. He there writes that, “De facto, the 
analyses [of the first edition] were executed as analyses of essence” (Husserl, 2002, 
312)22. On the other hand, as just stated, we cannot trust Husserl’s own interpretation 
of his work. Indeed, as we find that Husserl presents conflicting readings of the first 
edition around the same time (in the foreword to the second edition and in “Draft of 
a Preface”), we have a clear example of why his own understanding of the first edition 
is particularly troublesome, to say the least.
Even though Husserl’s own words do not provide us with sufficient evidence, 
Ingarden’s interpretation can be recognized as correct, when it is noted that, in the 
100 years since the publication of the Investigations, scholars have consistently claimed 
and convincingly demonstrated that Husserl does formulate his 1901  theory as an 
immature eidetics. For some examples of such interpretations, Miguel Garcia-Baro’s 
1991  article is partially dedicated to arguing that, “In actuality, Husserl presented, 
already in the First Edition of his Logical Investigations, a very precise and elaborate 
theory of essence, one which he incorporated as a major constituent in his ‘Elements 
of a Phenomenological Elucidation of Knowledge’ (Sixth Investigation)” (Garcia-Ba-
ro, 1991, 233). Moreover, Robert Sokolowski, in his 1971  text, shows clearly that a 
core goal of the first edition is “to bring the essence out in such a process […] which 
Husserl calls eidetic intuition” (Sokolowski, 1971, 337). For one final example, Dieter 
Lohmar grounds his analysis of the Investigations on the fact that, in the first edition, 
“Husserl’s method is a descriptive analysis of acts of consciousness. It seeks not only to 
be an empirical-psychological investigation of factual consciousness but to determine 
the essential, necessary structures of consciousness” (Lohmar, 2019, 110)23.
‘eidetic reduction.’ Accordingly, it could be said that the Review of the second edition inspires or 
perhaps is in continuity with Ingarden’s later thought in this regard. 
21 While written in 1913, the text was only published in 1939. Ingarden, to my knowledge, was not 
acquainted with the Draft, as only Fink, Langrebe, and Stein worked on these relevant manuscripts 
to prepare them for publication. For more information on the history of “Draft of a Preface,” see 
(Bossert & Peters, 1975, XVII–XX).
22 Moreover, Husserl goes so far as to correctly state that, if he were simply studying the factical expe-
riences of consciousness in the first edition, his analysis would have fallen back into psychologism. 
He writes in “Draft of a Preface” that, “The entire refutation of psychologism rests on the fact that 
the analysis, especially that of the Sixth [Investigation], but also the other Investigations, were taken 
as analyses of essences” (Husserl, 2002, 312).
23 For other examples of prominent scholars who maintain this interpretation, see (Heffernan, 2013; 
Fisette, 2009; Kersten, 1975).
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At the same time, Ingarden is right to state that Husserl did not have a properly 
mature understanding of his philosophical project as an examination of the essences 
of experience. Ingarden correctly notes that the eidetic nature of phenomenology only 
became strongly emphasized in the second edition of Investigations. Ursula Panzer, 
in agreement with Ingarden’s interpretation, writes, “The pure eidetic orientation of 
phenomenology was stressed by Husserl in numerous editions and changes of the 
second edition” (Panzer, 1984, XXXII). Husserl also acknowledges this point in “Draft 
of a Preface,” stating that, even though he was performing eidetic studies, “they were 
not executed in an entirely clear reflective consciousness” (Husserl, 2002, 312). In 
particular, Husserl had not made evident what exact role the investigated examples of 
experience played in the uncovering of essences. It is only in the second edition that 
Husserl explicitly states that they are exemplary singular cases, on the basis of which, 
ideation can be performed (Husserl, 1975, 412).
3. TRANSCENDENTAL REDUCTION
While Ingarden claims that Husserl’s first and second edition are similar to 
each other as both study essences, he concludes that the second edition still “stresses 
a current conception of phenomenology that is somewhat different” (Ingarden, 1915, 
307/1993, 5). This change to Husserl’s project, which Ingarden notes, is that Husserl is 
now seeking to describe transcendental consciousness. Stated in more explicit terms, 
according to Ingarden, Husserl transforms his philosophy from a metaphysically real-
ist eidetic psychology into an idealist transcendental phenomenology. He writes that, 
this novel conception of the second edition, “is bound up with Husserl’s efforts to 
resolve the problem pertaining to [the notion of] pure transcendental consciousness” 
(Ingarden, 1915, 307/1993, 5).
Concretely, this means, according to Ingarden, that Husserl has altered how he 
conceives of consciousness. Husserl, in 1901, distinguished between phenomenolog-
ical and intentional contents of consciousness, claiming that only the latter can be 
studied by his descriptive psychology. Husserl—in his programmatic claims—asserts 
that the intentional content and object are excluded from his domain of research (Hus-
serl, 1984, 352–375)24. These phenomenological contents are understood, in 1901, as 
the “reell phenomenological unity of the I-experience” (Husserl, 1984, 411). Husserl 
described phenomenological consciousness as the reell Bestand of the intention, in-
cluding the Inhalt (sensations or sensory phantasms), apprehension, and quality of 
24 As a result of this choice, as Zahavi writes, “All that is left to phenomenology seems to be noetic 
analyses” (Zahavi, 2002, 101).
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the act (Husserl, 1984, 624–625). Ingarden summarizes this point by writing, “The 
domain of study was [in the first edition] pure consciousness as the totality of all 
‘Experiences’ […] one should note that in the First Edition ‘Experience’ signified all 
moments which really are consciousness (reele Momente des Aktes)” (Ingarden, 1915, 
307/1993, 6). The importance of this conclusion for Ingarden, which goes unstated 
in the Review itself, is that Husserl’s descriptions ostensibly make no explicit claims 
about the existence of the intentional object of consciousness, such that he can be read 
as the metaphysical realist, which Ingarden took him to be.
In the second edition; however, Husserl alters his notion of and terminology 
regarding consciousness. He states that the phenomenological contents, which are ex-
amined by his philosophy, include not only the reell contents, but also the intentional 
contents and object (Husserl, 1984, 335, 391–393). Ingarden writes, “Currently, in 
addition to those ‘reelle Momente (Inhalt) des Akte,’ (today) the subject matter of phe-
nomenology includes not only the ‘noesis,’ but also the ‘noema’ of the intentional Ex-
periences, which, as connected into a stream of consciousness, and as acts belonging 
to a ‘pure Ego,’ make up transcendental consciousness” (Ingarden, 1915, 307/1993, 6). 
Both the reel and intentional contents are now taken to be moments within the whole 
intentional correlation, where both must be studied always together. Importantly, 
Ingarden takes this to mean that Husserl has transformed the Investigations into a 
transcendental project. The object cannot be said to exist out there in what Ingarden 
takes to be the “real” world, but rather, “can only exist just as it constitutes itself in a 
strictly circumscribed manifold of pure acts, as the necessary correlate of those acts, 
acts from which it draws its very ‘sense’ and ‘existence’ ” (Ingarden, 1915, 307/1993, 
6). Ingarden believes that, as a result of this change, the fundamental goals of Husserl’s 
phenomenology have shifted. While Husserl’s philosophy was, on Ingarden’s account, 
previously conceived of as a preliminary epistemological investigation into the foun-
dation of sciences, it is now taken to be, “the ultimate and absolute elucidation of the 
sense of all objects” (Ingarden, 1915, 307/1993, 6).
Ingarden justifies this interpretation by turning to Husserl’s analysis of sensa-
tions and the objects, which they can intuitively represent. Ingarden summarizes Hus-
serl’s view by writing, “The sensations present, in corresponding perceptions of the 
material object, objective characteristics of those objects, and they do so by means of 
apprehensions that confer sense and categorial form on [sensations]” (Ingarden, 1915, 
308/1993, 7). From this, Ingarden concludes that, in the new edition, Husserl accepts 
the fundamentally transcendental conclusion that, “Nature is the necessary correlate 
of a certain determinate structure of a group of transcendental acts” (Ingarden, 1915, 
308/1993, 7).
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Is Ingarden correct in his interpretation concerning the importance of the tran-
scendental reduction for the new formulation of the second edition? While Ingarden 
is not entirely off the mark, his assertions are certainly less than accurate. On the 
one hand, Ingarden is correct to see that Husserl is attempting to raise his project of 
the second edition of Investigations to a transcendental idealism. On the other hand, 
the exact details of how successful Husserl is in this attempt are seemingly lost to In-
garden.
The first inadequate view of Ingarden’s reading of these ideas, which needs to 
be discussed, does not concern the changes Husserl made in the second edition, but 
rather his understanding of the first edition. These issues need to be raised, because it 
is on the basis of this misreading that Ingarden commits his misinterpretation of the 
second edition. Straightforwardly asserted, Ingarden is incorrect when he states that 
Husserl made no claims about the objects of intentions in 1901, but that he was only 
looking at the reell content of consciousness. Because Ingarden had read Husserl’s 
1901 Investigations as endorsing a metaphysical realism, he believed that Husserl’s de-
scriptive psychology would not come close to suggesting that the object is constituted 
by consciousness. Yet, it is evident that Husserl does make many statements about the 
intentional object in the first edition25. Despite Husserl’s methodological claims to 
the contrary, his descriptive psychology was never limited to an analysis of the reell 
content. Even in the introduction to the Investigations, where Husserl emphasizes that 
his project will examine the reell, Husserl writes that the intention possesses both 
the reel content and the ideal intentional content and that the intentional object is a 
descriptive trait of the intention (Hussrl, 1984, 5–23). Zahavi explains how Husserl’s 
descriptions of the intentional object become even more explicit in the Fifth Investi-
gation, writing:
Husserl’s last comment is confirmed in the Fifth Investigation, with its focus on inten-
tionality. A careful study of this Investigation immediately reveals that Husserl constant-
ly makes references to both the intentional object and the intentional content in his anal-
ysis. Not only does his investigation disclose that the act is composed of an immanent 
content, it also instantiates an intentional content, and constitutes an intentional object. 
(Zahavi, 2002, 101)26
This first inadequate view leads directly to Ingarden’s misreading of the changes 
Husserl makes in the second edition. Namely, Ingarden is misguided when he asserts 
25 On this point, see (Byrne, 2017a, 2017b).
26 While I largely agree with Zahavi, I would push back against his claim that Husserl asserts that 
consciousness constitutes the object in the first edition. 
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that Husserl’s terminological alterations fundamentally shift the substance of his anal-
yses to be an examination of transcendental consciousness and its constitutive pow-
ers. Even though Husserl claims that the phenomenological contents are now to be 
understood as the reell and the intentional contents, this does not materially change 
how Husserl executes his study. He does not, as he does in Ideas, execute a robust de-
scriptive analysis of the noema. Rather, his previous descriptions concerning the act 
and (to a lesser extent) the intentional object, stand in largely the same form as they 
appeared in the first edition. Ursula Panzer, in her introduction to the Husserliana 
edition, emphasizes this point in even more explicit terms, writing, “Irrespective of 
these changes in terminology, in the reworking of the Fifth Investigation, there is no 
indication of the fact that Husserl pursued this ‘methodological suggestion’ […] The 
original limitation of phenomenological analysis to the reel contents of experience 
was thus not [fully] repealed” (1975, LIV-LV). 
Furthermore, a close examination of the second edition reveals that Ingarden’s 
justification for his interpretative claims also falls flat. In contrast to Ingarden’s con-
clusions, in the first and second editions, Husserl’s descriptions of the apprehension of 
sensations are almost identical. That is, during his discussion of apprehension, Hus-
serl does not add any conclusions about the transcendental nature of consciousness, 
nor does he make any explicit metaphysical claims about the existence of the intended 
object (Cf. Drummond, 2003; Urban, 2010). From this, one can also conclude that the 
overall goals of the text do not shift as substantially as Ingarden asserts.
4. LOGIC
The final particularly noteworthy tenet of Ingarden’s reading of Husserl’s sec-
ond edition, which should be briefly touched upon, is his interpretation of Husserl’s 
new conception of logic. Indeed, Ingarden dedicates an exceptional number of words 
to this topic, as the Fourth Investigation was reworked extensively in Husserl’s new 
edition. 
Forgoing further introductory comments, I note that Ingarden states that, while 
composing the second edition, Husserl became clear on the relationship between for-
mal logic and epistemology. Ingarden’s 1901 Husserl concludes that formal logic in-
vestigates meanings in their unities so as to establish a “deductive system of logical 
propositions” (Ingarden, 1915, 309/1993, 7). In contrast, Husserl would conclude, in 
1913, that in order to attain philosophical knowledge of logical truths, so Ingarden 
states, “we must bring to philosophical clarity the basic logical concepts and laws” (In-
garden, 1915, 309/1993, 8). That is, we have to execute the pertinent acts of meaning 
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in an intuitive manner, so as to evidently perceive their validity. Moreover, Ingarden 
claims that these conclusions stand in contrast to those of the first edition, because 
they differentiate, in no uncertain terms, the orientation of epistemology and logic. 
While logic is concerned with the meanings of acts and their intuited meant objects, 
“the objects of epistemology are the essences of the very acts of cognitive conscious-
ness, and its ultimate aim is self-evident insight into the essence of cognition and its 
variants” (Ingarden, 1915, 309/1993, 8). Importantly, on this basis, Ingarden claims 
that Husserl also shifts his understanding of the interrelationship between logic and 
phenomenology. He states that Husserl now conceives of phenomenology as provid-
ing the foundation for logic, writing, “Having gained clarity concerning the essence of 
phenomenology, Husserl abandoned his earlier defense against the reproach of a ‘re-
lapse into psychologism’ and replaced it with an argument to the effect that philosophi-
cal logic has its foundations in pure phenomenology” (Ingarden, 1915, 309/1993, 7). 
To be finally noted is that Ingarden believes that Husserl also changes his ac-
count of the three levels of pure logical grammar — and specifically the second, which 
is meant as a safeguard against Widersinn. In contrast to the first edition, Ingarden 
claims, 
inconsistency of sense (Widersinn), which is determined by logical laws of validity is now 
conceived […] as the impossibility (or, in the case of consistency of sense, as the possi-
bility) of the existence of the objects expressed by the meaning, insofar as the objects are 
conditioned by meanings’ own peculiar essence. (Ingarden, 1915, 309/1993, 8) 
For Ingarden, this new theory of Widersinn is critical to determining the logical 
sphere of meaning and to describing the objects meant by the meaning.
One final time, we must ask, are Ingarden’s interpretative claims correct? 
Straightforwardly stated, Ingarden not only accurately outlines most of Husserl’s con-
clusions, but also predicts many of the later developments of Husserl’s thought. 
Concerning Ingarden’s reading of Husserl’s reconception of the relationship be-
tween logic and epistemology, he is by and large right. While Husserl’s understanding 
of that relationship, in 1901, was more precise than Ingarden gives him credit for27, it 
is still the case that Husserl does more maturely distinguish between logic and epis-
27 Rinofner-Kreidl writes, that for the Husserl of 1901, “the task of descriptive psychology [is] to 
determine the relationship between psychology and logic with the help of an investigation of inten-
tional experiences and their contents. Descriptive psychology is to deliver a description of the ori-
gin of the fundamental logical concepts in determinate types of acts and to explicate a doctrine of 
the intentionality of consciousness that clarifies how a consciousness must be constituted such that 
an objective relation to objects [objektive Gegenstandsbeziehung] is possible for it” (Rinofner-Kreidl, 
2019, 27). Cf. (Byrne, 2017c, 2018, 2019). 
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temology in the new edition in many of the ways that Ingarden outlines. At the same 
time, Ingarden exaggerates the evolution of Husserl’s understanding of phenomenol-
ogy and logic. Husserl had not yet, in the 1913  edition, recognized that he would 
have to “abandon” his attack of psychologism, to instead defend his philosophy by 
grounding logic in transcendental phenomenology. In fact, this insight would only 
occur to Husserl much later in his career; namely, in his Formal and Transcendental 
Logic (Husserl, 1977). Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl summarizes this turn in the late Husserl 
well, when she writes, 
In Formal and Transcendental Logic […] Husserl now sees the reason for the failure 
of a scientific logic up to this time in the objectivistic attitude of logical investigations, 
which separates the logical objects from every relation to subjective acts of thinking. A 
transformation in phenomenology’s conception of science underlies this turn against 
objectivism: Pure logic, as ‘objectivistic’ universal doctrine of science, is not the funda-
mental science, but rather pure phenomenology, whose object is the intentional relation 
(conceived in abstraction from existence). (Rinofner-Kreidl, 2019, 38)
Finally, it can be said that Husserl also did not completely reform his under-
standing of Widersinn, by claiming that such counter-sense could be recognized via an 
intuition of the impossibility of the meaning. Instead, Husserl retained his insight that 
counter-sense could only be discovered by intuiting analytic or synthetic inconsisten-
cy. It should be noted, as it is of importance to the evolution of Husserl’s oeuvre, that 
his theory of possibility and impossibility would undergo a radical transformation in 
his unpublished 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Logical Investigation (Hua XX-1/2). 
There, Husserl, via an extensive analysis, does shift his views in ways that are crucial 
for his understanding of the logical sphere and for his conception of the overarching 
nature of his transcendental idealism (Husserl, 2002, 171–217). As I cannot go into 
the details of Husserl’s new and complex theory of possibility and impossibility from 
the 1913/14 Revisions here, I direct the reader to Bernet’s expert 2004 article on that 
transformation28.
28 Bernet writes that, when developing this new account of possibility, “Husserl is never moved to 
cast doubt upon the intentional correlation between the act and the object […] Making headway 
in this direction, Husserl is not only brought to distinguish between a broad verses a strict sense of 
phenomenological idealism, but will also show that the transcendental consciousness that assures 
us of the actual reality of the world must be a consciousness that is once both embodied and inter-
subjective” (Bernet, 2004, 4). 
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5. CONCLUSION
In this essay, I explored and critically assessed Ingarden’s interpretation of the 
second edition of Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Despite the fact that Ingarden com-
posed his text at a tumultuous time in his philosophical career—as the publication of 
Ideas I shook his understanding of Husserl’s theory—and even though the phenom-
enological movement was in its infancy, Ingarden was able to paint a surprisingly 
accurate picture of Husserl’s changes to his “breakthrough” work. While Ingarden was 
not able to provide a fully accurate account of the role of the transcendental reduction 
in the second edition, he was able to clearly identify the similarities between the eidet-
ics of the first and second editions and he even anticipated some of the conclusions, 
which Husserl would arrive at in his future works on formal and transcendental logic. 
Moreover, by executing this analysis, I have shown how research on the Investigations 
has matured in the one hundred years since the release of that work, while also pre-
senting my own views concerning these difficult interpretative issues.
It is my hope that by executing the goals of this paper, other scholars will be 
inspired to draw not only from Ingarden’s later writings, as has often been the case, 
but also to produce research on his early texts, including this 1915 Review. On this 
point, I should mention that, while I have touched upon some of the important ten-
ets of Ingarden’s assessment, he develops many other insights about Husserl’s work 
throughout the Review, which are worthy of study, as those conclusions are not only 
fascinating in themselves, but also because they help to shape Ingarden’s later thought. 
These include Ingarden’s analyses of Husserl’s transformation of his descriptions of 
the ego and Husserl’s new insights about independent and non-independent objects, 
Husserl’s novel conception of the relationship between psychology and the natural 
sciences, and finally, Husserl’s different approach to his confrontation with Hume and 
Locke in the second edition. A more comprehensive investigation into these other 
interpretative claims and how they relate to and motivate Ingarden’s thinking about 
Husserl, transcendental philosophy, and ontology would; however, be the task of a 
much larger project. It was rather the more modest goal of this paper to present a crit-
ical assessment of Ingarden’s 1915 Review, so as to shed new light on his early thought 
and on the inception of the communal project of phenomenology. 
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